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Leibnizian Pluralism and Bradleian Monism: A Question of Relations 
 
Pauline Phemister (Edinburgh)1 
 
 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the poles of monism and pluralism were 
represented respectively in the philosophies of Francis Herbert Bradley (1846-1924) 
and Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947).  Their speculative philosophical systems 
recursively mirrored the monist-pluralist polarity that had been represented in the 
seventeenth-century in the philosophies of Spinoza and Leibniz.  Cutting across the 
historical timelines, this paper asks whether Bradley’s denial of the reality of relations 
– a denial that is central to his defence of a non-relational absolute monism – 
threatens Leibniz’s pluralist ontology of individual substances that stand in various 
relations to one another.  
 
In what follows, I begin with an overview of Bradley’s absolute monism before 
turning his arguments against relational thinking. Where appropriate, I highlight 
relevant parallels and contrasts between Leibniz’s finite substances and Bradley’s 
finite centres. Finally, I assess Leibniz’s pluralism in the light of Bradley’s arguments 
by considering whether Leibnizian relations among individual substances can 
withstand Bradley’s critique.  
 
1. Bradley’s Absolute Idealism 
 
Bradley defended his absolute idealist metaphysical system in his canonical 
Appearance and Reality of 1893,2 in which he contrasts Reality – the single, Absolute 
Experience that, in the word of one commentator, is ‘simply the totality of all that 
there truly is’3 – with Appearance or appearances, namely, those lesser experiences 
                                                        
1 I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Pierfrancesco Basile for his useful comments on 
earlier drafts of this paper and to the organiser and participants of the Leibniz und die Realität 
conference who also provided useful feedback. Errors that remain are entirely my own.  
2 F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1893).  The edition 
used here is the second edition, published in 1897 and issued in paperback, with an 
introduction by R. Wollheim, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.   
3 T. L. S. Sprigge: James and Bradley: American Truth and British Reality, Chicago and La 
Salle 1993, p. 264. 
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that exist within the greater whole but which are ontologically less real and 
epistemologically less true on account of their falling short of the whole in which they 
reside. In the words of that same commentator, an appearance is only ‘something 
which has a low degree of reality compared with what would figure in a finally 
satisfactory metaphysic’, for an appearance is something, the concept of which may 
be useful, but which is ultimately incoherent and ‘could not be applied in a judgement 
which was absolutely true’.4  Reality is what is truly real and really true; appearances 
are only partially so. Reality must be consistent, harmonious, unitary, ordered, perfect 
and timeless. Anything that involves relations, such as time and space, is (for reasons 
we explore below) fraught with contradiction and therefore cannot be truly real. And 
since all thought is inherently relational, and thereby contradictory,5 it follows that the 
Absolute is not wholly graspable by thought.  
 
Bradley admits the existence of nothing that falls outside of experience – more 
precisely, he holds that there is nothing that can be said about anything that falls 
outside of any experience, whether this be the Experience that is the Absolute or the 
kind of experiences we ourselves have.6 Even though Reality, as a single Experience 
and the highest reality, is an indivisible unity, it incorporates subordinate aspects. 
Within the Absolute are what he calls, ‘finite centres of experience’, also sometimes 
termed ‘this-mines’.7 These, though less real than the Absolute, are still real to some 
degree. Their nature is most easily grasped in terms of our own experiences and in 
terms of experiences we suppose are had by others.  A unified experiential state, 
which may include in its totality both the perceiving self and the world as perceived 
                                                        
4 Sprigge: James and Bradley, p. 263.  
5 “Thought is relational and discursive, and, if it ceases to be this, it commits suicide” (F. H. 
Bradley: Appearance and Reality, p. 150). The contradictoriness of thought is presented as a 
problem of the unification of diversity in “Note A. Contradiction, and the Contrary”, in the 
Appendix of Bradley: Appearance and Reality, pp. 508-509: “thought in its own nature has 
no ‘together’ and is forced to move by way of terms and relations, and the unity of these 
remains in the end external, and, because external, inconsistent. … my intellect is discursive, 
and to understand it must go from one point to another, and in the end also must go by a 
movement which it feels satisfies its nature. Thus, to understand a complex AB, I must begin 
with A or B. And beginning, say, with A, if I then merely find B, I have either lost A or I have 
for beside A something else, and in neither case have I understood. For my intellect cannot 
simply unite a diversity, nor has it in itself any form or way of togetherness, and you gain 
nothing if beside A and B you offer me their conjunction in fact. For to my intellect that is no 
more than another external element.” 
6 Bradley: Appearance and Reality, pp. 127- 128. 
7 Bradley: Appearance and Reality, pp.197-212 passim. 
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from that particular perspective, counts as a ‘finite centre’ – ‘an immediate experience 
of itself and of the Universe in one’.8 Not all finite centres are consciously aware – 
not all contain an aspect that is a ‘self’ – but all are unified experiential states that 
differ from the experiential states of others.  Each finite centre of experience, as 
Sprigge explains, ‘is particularly associated with a certain position in the space and 
time of the object world, from which, so to speak, it looks out at that world’.9 Of 
course, the finite centres of experience cannot be detached from the Absolute whole. 
Rather, all seemingly independent and inter-related things must, because of the 
contradictory nature of relations, be subsumed, resolved, transformed or ‘transmuted’ 
in the Absolute Experience.10 In the final analysis, even though finite centres are 
(incoherently) identifiable as specific points of view within an apparent temporal 
sequence, they are eternally aspects of the timeless Absolute.11 As subsidiary aspects 
of the Absolute Experience, each finite centre is ‘just one of the positions from which 
the Absolute looks out eternally at the world’.12  
 
Some finite centres have (or rather, ‘are’) experiences that are divided and relational. 
In the experiential content of some finite centres, it is possible to distinguish the self, 
on the one hand, and nature or the world, on the other.   In others, no such distinction 
is present: their experience is a mere ‘feeling’, a pre-relational, ‘immediate 
experience’ in which the finite centre’s experience is not yet broken up into the 
perceiver and perceived.  However, this differentiation of types of finite centres with 
its implicit suggestion of a plurality of finite centres in relation to each other is 
ultimately an illusion. In the supra-relational Absolute Experience, contradictions 
apparent in the relational experiences – including contradictions involved in 
conceiving a plurality of finite centres in relation to each other – are overcome, 
synthesised into a unified and undivided whole.  Bradley’s Absolute unifies all the 
experiences had by the finite centres into one grand Absolute Experience.  
                                                        
8 F. H. Bradley: “What is the Real Julius Caesar?”, in: F. H. Bradley: Essays on Truth and 
Reality, Oxford 1914, p. 410. 
9 Sprigge: James and Bradley, p. 282. 
10 Appearance and Reality, p.183; see also Appearance and Reality, p. 529. 
11 Some commentators discern in Bradley’s corpus evidence of two kinds of finite centre: 
momentary and enduring.  See Leemon B. McHenry: Whitehead and Bradley: A Comparative 
Analysis, Albany NY 1992, p. 32 and (with qualifications) Sprigge: James and Bradley, pp. 
281-286. However, cp. Bradley: “What is the Real Julius Caesar?”, p. 411.  
12 Sprigge: James and Bradley, p. 282. 
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Leibniz resisted Spinoza’s claim that there is ultimately only one Substance, 
postulating instead a plurality of co-existing individual finite substances that 
constitute a universe that is itself only an aggregate of substances and not a unified 
substance in its own right.  Undoubtedly, Leibniz would also have resisted Bradley’s 
assertion of a unified Absolute Experience that contains finite experiential wholes 
only as aspects, not as substances. Nevertheless, despite the pluralist-monist divide, 
there are significant similarities between Leibniz’s understanding of monadic 
perceptions and Bradley’s view of finite centres of experience.  
 
T. S. Eliot was one of the first to notice similarities in the views of Bradley and 
Leibniz.13  Eliot undertakes a comparison of Leibniz’s monads and Bradley’s finite 
centres of experience, finding a remarkable convergence, not least because he avers 
that Leibniz finds it difficult to differentiate between substantial unities and accidental 
unities.  Once the issue of the substantiality of the monads is brought into question 
and attention focused on monadic perceptions, Leibniz’s monads do come to resemble 
Bradley’s finite centres very closely indeed.  Each, for instance, constructs the notion 
of an external world from its perceptions or experiences, a world it perceives from its 
own particular point of view and which it in some sense contains within itself – each 
of Bradley’s finite centres, Eliot notes, is ‘while it lasts’ the whole world.14   
 
Comparing Bradley’s finite centres, not merely with monads per se, but rather with 
the monads’ temporary or fleeting perceptions uncovers further similarities.  Neither 
is a substance; each is a fleeting or temporary state.  Moreover, each is a unitary 
experience and, in the case of all monadic perceptions and Bradley’s higher-level 
experiences, embraces multiplicity or diversity in unity. Perceptions that Leibniz 
considered possible in the case of the higher animals and rational beings – those 
capable of some kind of consciousness and self-consciousness are not unlike those 
that Bradley attributed to finite centres capable of relational thought.  Even when a 
                                                        
13 T. S. Eliot: “Leibniz’s Monads and Bradley’s Finite Centres”, in: The Monist XXVI (1916), 
pp. 566-576; reprinted in: T. S. Eliot: Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. 
Bradley, London 1964, pp. 198-207.  More recently, Massimo Mugnai has contrasted Leibniz 
and Bradley on relations. See M. Mugnai: “Leibniz and ‘Bradley’s Regress’”, in: The Leibniz 
Review 20 (2010), pp. 1-12.  
14 Eliot: Knowledge and Experience, p. 204. 
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rational monad distinctly perceives certain aspects of the world, it does not cease to 
have insensible perceptions of the rest. Monadic perceptual states are multi-faceted 
unitary states in which insensible perceptions are often constitutive of sensible 
perceptual states in which the monad is conscious (as in the case of animals), while 
both insensible and sensible perceptions are sometimes also constitutive of self-
conscious perceptual states (as in the case of thoughts had by rational beings).    
Similarly, even when Bradley’s finite centres include relational thoughts, these retain 
the lower-level or more basic immediate experiences of bare feeling.  As Bradley 
explains, immediate experience remains as the ‘felt background’ even in our self-
conscious states:  
 
In self-consciousness a part or element, or again a general aspect or character, 
becomes distinct from the whole mass and stands over against the felt 
background. But the background is never exhausted by this object, and it 
never could be so.15 
 
Our feeling is one and is whole, but none the less may contain pieces of 
relational matter, inside which the form of feeling is certainly not dominant. ... 
[It is] an experience ... which, being more than merely simple, holds a many in 
one, and contains a diversity within a unity which itself is not relational.16 
 
Effectively, immediate experience remains as a foundation even when we are thinking 
relationally.17 However, unlike Leibnizian insensible perceptions, immediate 
experience cannot be regarded as constitutive of relational experiences, for this would 
imply a part-whole relation that, as we shall see, Bradley will not condone.  A more 
appropriate comparison holds rather between the finite centre’s immediate experience 
and the monad’s perception taken as a whole, in which diversity is reconciled in the 
unitary state of the monad at any one moment. 
 
                                                        
15 Bradley: Appearance and Reality, p. 174. 
16 F. H Bradley: “Relations”, in:  F. H. Bradley: Collected Essays, Oxford, 1935, pp. 628-676, 
pp. 632-633. 
17 Bradley writes: “We in short have experience in which there is no distinction between my 
awareness and that of which it is aware. There is an immediate feeling, a knowing and being 
in one, with which knowledge begins; and, though this in a manner is transcended, it 
nevertheless remains as throughout as the present foundation of my known world … 
immediate experience, however much transcended, both remains and is active. It is not a 
stage which shows itself at the beginning and then disappears, but it remains at the bottom 
throughout as fundamental” (“On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience”, in Bradley: 
Essays on Truth and Reality, pp. 159-160, 161). 
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Bradley’s finite centres of experience are still appearances, but they are more real 
than physical objects. Finite centres are themselves unitary experiences and in this 
respect, they are truer to the character or nature of the Absolute (and hence for 
Bradley, more real) than are physical objects. Whereas for Leibniz, physical objects 
are well-founded phenomena, that is to say, they are aggregates of substances whose 
existence does not depend upon our perceiving them, for Bradley, sensible objects are 
purely phenomenal – they are nothing more than the sensible contents of immediate 
experiences or finite centres. We shall consider later the pluralism that Leibniz’s view 
requires.  For the moment, however, we confine our attention to Bradley’s account of 
sensible objects.    
 
On Bradley’s view, the external world of physical objects is a construction deriving 
from the content of the finite centres’ experiences.18  It must be understood in relation 
to the self.  Within some finite centres of experience, the content is distinguished into 
that relating to the self and that which relates to everything else – not-self or nature.  
The natural or physical world is conceived as a world composed of distinct, inert, 
non-experiential things.  It involves a double abstraction.  First, physical objects are 
abstracted from the experience within which they reside, that is, they are abstracted 
from the sensible experiences in which they appear.  In effect, in order to conceive an 
external world, we have to consider it as if it were, per impossibile, capable of 
existing independently of any finite centre’s or Absolute experience of it. 
Epistemologically, this separates the knower from that which is known, the perceiver 
from that which is perceived, an act that leads us further from truth and reality rather 
than closer.  The error is compounded when, by the second abstraction, physical 
things are separated from each other so that we conceive this mind-independent 
external world as divided up into distinct and separable objects. Each object is 
conceived as a distinct individual thing that stands in relation to the others, but which 
is separable from them.19   
                                                        
18 A finite centre is “a basis on and from which the world of objects is made.” (Bradley: 
“What is the Real Julius Caesar?”, p. 411.  In this sense, nature exists only as the not-self 
aspect of a finite centre.  Whether there are as many object-worlds as there are finite centres 
or whether it is the same world in each finite centre is a question I cannot address here. 
However, for discussion, see Sprigge: James and Bradley, pp. 532-537, esp. 533 & 537.  
19 A third abstraction comes into play here too as our experiences of this apparent ‘world’ are 
similarly divided into experiences of one thing and another, such that one part of the 
experience of the world is separated from (that is to say, abstracted from) the rest. 
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In the hierarchical order of degrees of reality, the physical world, abstracted from the 
experience out of which it is constructed, is less real than the finite centres from 
which it arises. As experiences in which ‘many’ aspects are unified in a single 
experience, finite centres bear greater similarity to the Absolute Experience that is 
Reality; their character is truer to the nature of the Absolute, though still, as mere 
aspects of the Absolute, finite centres fall short of full reality. Not being a unified 
experience, however, the physical world as mere appearance is less real than either 
the Absolute or the finite centres of experience.  
 
Both the physical world and finite centres are less real than the Absolute because their 
concepts are contradictory. They can therefore occur only as appearances, for what is 
real cannot involve contradiction. Reality itself must transform or transcend all 
contradictory relations. Contradictions, Bradley contends, arise in all forms of 
relational thought.  Thinking of a plurality of finite centres that stand in relation to 
each other exposes a morass of contradiction. In the Absolute, therefore, there is no 
plurality of independent, self-subsisting finite substances – or, in Bradley’s 
terminology, no plurality of independent, self-subsisting ‘reals’.20  In the case of 
physical objects, contradictions appear when individual objects are perceived as 
standing in various relations (spatial, causal, etc) to each other and when they are 
conceived as standing in relation to the self that perceives them.  All such 
contradictions, so Bradley argues, can be overcome only when transformed within the 
Absolute that transcends all relations.  
 
2. Bradley’s Argument against Relations 
 
Although Bradley argues against the possibility of reducing a relation to a quality of a 
substance in chapter 2, his formal argument against relations generally is presented in 
chapter 3 of Appearance and Reality.  In a four-part argument, he attempts to show 
that both internal relations (those essential relations that belong to things related as 
properties such that the very natures of the things would be different if they did not 
stand in relation to each other) and external relations (accidental relations that are 
                                                        
20 Bradley: Appearance and Reality, pp. 124-126 passim. 
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extraneous to the things related such that the natures of the related things would be 
unaffected if the relation did not hold)21 are contradictory and unreal.  While for 
practical purposes, relational ways of thinking are indispensable, we err if we take 
them as holding true of Reality itself.22   
 
Bradley’s strategy in Appearance and Reality consists in arguing that each of four 
jointly inconsistent propositions must be true. Since relations require that all four are 
true, relations and relational ways of thinking are thereby exposed as contradictory 
and condemned to the status of appearance rather than reality.   In turn, Bradley 
argues that:  
 
(i) Qualities (terms) are nothing without relations   
(ii) Qualities (terms) with relations are unintelligible 
(iii) Relations without qualities (terms) are nothing 
(iv) Relations with qualities (terms) are unintelligible23 
 
Bradley maintains that all four propositions, (i) through (iv), must be true if relations 
are to be possible, but of course, all four cannot be true without becoming entangled 
in contradiction. (i) through (iv) cannot all be true at the same time.  On the side of 
qualities, there can be no qualities without relations (i), but equally there can be no 
qualities with relations (ii), while on the side of relations, there can be no relations 
without terms (iii), but nor can there be any relations with terms (iv). If Bradley’s 
arguments for each proposition succeed, he will have shown that relational ways of 
thinking are infected throughout with contradictions and that, therefore, on the 
assumption that Reality is non-contradictory, they are no more than illusory 
appearances that are not true of Reality itself.  
 
                                                        
21 See Bradley: “Relations”, pp. 642-645.  
22 Bradley: Appearance and Reality, p. 28. 
23 In his essay, “Relations” (op.cit.), Bradley prefers to talk of “terms” rather than “qualities”.  
A “term” is “so far independent as to have become an individual with a being and character of 
its own” (p. 634).  Terms, therefore, can stand in relations to each other while each 
nonetheless retains retaining its own individuality, a feature that is not so evident in the case 
of qualities.     In chapter 3 of Appearance and Reality, following discussion of the relation 
between a thing and its qualities in chapter 2, Bradley treats “term” and “quality” as 
interchangeable. 
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(i) and (iii) comprise the argument against external relations, while (ii) and (iv) 
constitute the argument again internal relations. We examine Bradley’s critique of 
external relations first.  
 
2.1 Against external relations: (i) and (iii)  
(i) Qualities (terms) are nothing without relations  
That there can be no qualities if qualities do not stand in some relation to each other, 
Bradley thinks is evident from the fact that qualities differ from each other and so, at 
the very least, must stand in relations of difference. Not only do we never find 
qualities without relations, but we never can find any quality without a relation, for 
the very coming into being of one quality distinct from another implies at least a 
relation of difference between the two qualities. We can only pick out a particular 
quality in our field of consciousness by distinguishing it from others – we can only, 
for instance, isolate a red patch in our visual field if we also notice that it is distinct 
from the differently coloured surrounding areas.  Of course, if there were only one 
quality in existence, this would not stand in relation to another.  This would be a 
possibility if the universe were no more than a single quality in the sense of being 
‘one unbroken simple feeling’.24  However, Bradley denies that this is really what we 
mean when we talk of ‘quality’. By quality, we usually mean to refer to one quality 
differentiated from others:  ‘a universe confined to one feeling would not only not be 
qualities, but it would fail even to be one quality, as different from others and as 
distinct from relations.’25  
 
However, although we need relations in order to identify individual qualities and to 
differentiate them from each other, can we not claim that once so distinguished, they 
assume a relation-independent existence?  Surely, once a quality has been identified 
through its difference with others, we can then forget about the difference and 
concentrate solely on the quality as it is in and of itself, independently of its relation 
to the others. Bradley rejects the suggestion.  He refuses to separate the process of 
differentiating the quality from the nature of the quality itself, instead insisting that 
the process by which a quality comes into being is part of its essence.  Being 
perceived in relation to other qualities is essential to the nature of any quality. The 
                                                        
24 Bradley: Appearance and Reality, p. 24. 
25 Bradley: Appearance and Reality, p. 24. 
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relations in which one quality stands to others are therefore internal relations, 
essential both to the existence and to the nature of each. In short, therefore, there can 
be no qualities (plural) without relations.  
 
Leibniz is in basic agreement with Bradley on this issue. Everything, in his view, is 
internally related to everything else in the universe:  
 
“There is no term which is so absolute or so detached that it does not involve 
relations and is not such that a complete analysis of it would lead to other 
things and indeed to all other things.”26  
 
(iii) Relations without qualities (terms) are nothing 
In the second part of his argument against external relations, Bradley notes that there 
can be no relations unless there are terms related by that relation.  The point may be 
granted.  Relations relate and must therefore have terms that they relate. As Bradley 
states, “a relation without terms seems mere verbiage ... a relation, we must say, 
without qualities is nothing.”27  Hence just as the relations are essential to the very 
being or nature of qualities, so too qualities or terms are essential to the very being or 
natures of relations. Any relation must itself be internally related to the terms it 
relates. No relation can stand alone independently of the terms that it relates.   
 
Even if there could be such a purely external relation, its very independence would 
mean that it would fail to relate its terms at all.  The relation would bear no point of 
contact with the terms, nor the terms with the relation: “From neither side will there 
be anything like a contribution to, or an entrance into, the other side – or again to, or 
into, that union of both which we experience as a relational fact.”28 Leibniz’s opinion 
was not dissimilar. He too held that merely external (or extrinsic) relations are 
inadequate. “[T]here are no purely extrinsic denominations, denominations which 
have absolutely no foundation in the very thing denominated,” he writes in Primary 
Truths, going on to explain,  
                                                        
26 A VI vi 228; New Essays, trans. P. Remnant and J. Bennett, Cambridge, 1985, p. 228. 
27 Appearance and Reality, p. 27. We may suppose that this is the case even if the terms 
themselves are relations.  
28 Bradley: “Relations”, p. 642.  
 11 
 
 “For it is necessary that the notion of the subject denominated contain the 
notion of the predicate. And consequently, whenever the denomination of a 
thing is changed, there must be a variation in the thing itself.”29 
 
Although this passage can be read in line with Russell’s conviction that extrinsic 
denominations depend upon, or can be reduced to, monadic, non-relational predicates 
in the subject (or term) of the relation,30 it can also be read in such as way as not to 
exclude the possibility that at least some of the internal properties of the subject on 
which the extrinsic denominations depend may be relational properties.31 Bradley, 
however, finds the notion of internal relations equally as problematic as that of 
external relations.  
 
2.2 Against internal relations (ii) and (iv) 
Bradley’s argument in Appearance and Reality against internal relations is subtle, but 
the problem is clear: internal relations involve infinite regresses.32  
 
(ii) Qualities (terms) with relations are unintelligible 
Bradley contends that in order for any quality to be internally related to another, it 
must have a “double character” or inner diversity, one aspect of which is the quality 
in itself (that which supports or grounds the relation) and the other being the relational 
aspect (the result of the thing standing in relation to another).  In Bradley’s own 
words, “Each has a double character, as both supporting and as being made by the 
relation. It may be taken as at once condition and result”.33  In effect, Bradley is 
suggesting that if a quality is to be internally related to another, it has to have its own 
                                                        
29 C 520; G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, tr. & ed. R. Ariew & D. Garber, Indianapolis, 
1989, p. 32. See also GP II 240; Leibniz to De Volder, April 1702: “Nam in loco esse non est 
nuda extrinseca denominatio: imo nulla datur denominatio adeo extrinseca ut non habeat 
intrinsecam pro fundamento”. 
30 B. Russell: A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, London, with introduction 
by J. Slater, London, 1992, pp. 12-15, 58.  
31 Hidé Ishiguro, for instance, has suggested that at least in the middle period, Leibniz 
intended the complete concept of an individual substance to include even those predicates that 
“ascribe relational properties to the individual.” (H. Ishiguro: Leibniz’s Philosophy of Logic 
and Language, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 1990, p. 131). 
32 A regress also arises in respect of external relations: if a relation is needed to relate two 
terms, then there is also a need for a further relation to relate the relation to each of its terms.  
33 Bradley: Appearance and Reality, p. 26. 
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character; only if this is so, can it have its own being as one of the terms in the 
relation. The quality must possess both its own core aspect – the foundation from 
which the relation may arise – and the relational aspect by which it is linked to the 
other.  The intuition supporting this view is not dissimilar to what, in Leibniz studies, 
Ishiguro has called “the presupposition thesis”, namely, the thesis “that things cannot 
stand in a relation to each other without having non-relational properties.”34  There 
must, it is claimed, be some non-relational properties by which a thing can be 
identified as an individual thing: “the set of non-relational properties of a thing must 
be enough to distinguish it from all others.”35 The distinct individual, with its non-
relational properties, is then capable of standing in relation to other individuals, also 
in possession of non-relational properties.  
 
Unfortunately, if, as Bradley maintains, qualities in relation do possess a “double 
character” as both condition and result, an infinite regress comes into view.  The 
condition-aspect and the result-aspect within the quality introduce a distinction within 
the quality that threatens its unity. The two aspects must themselves be internally 
related to each other.  However, this in turn will require a distinction in each of the 
aspects into further conditions and results, leading to a distinction within each aspect 
that can again only be brought into relation by another distinction of condition and 
result, and so on to infinity.   
 
Bradley’s argument against there being qualities with relations depends on the 
distinction of condition and result within the quality, but it is possible to question 
whether the condition and result really are separable. If they are not, the regress does 
not get started.  Some commentators have argued against the separation of condition 
and result. Richard Wollheim, for instance, has claimed that Bradley considers as 
cause and effect, or as ground and consequent, what are really one and the same thing: 
colour A can only be darker than colour B if A is the colour it is, but it can only be the 
colour it is if it is darker than B. These are no more than two different ways of 
considering the same thing.36      
                                                        
34 Ishiguro: Leibniz’s Philosophy of Logic and Language, pp. 126-127. 
35 See Ishiguro: Leibniz’s Philosophy of Logic and Language, p. 130. 
36 R. Wollheim: F. H. Bradley, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1959, reissued 1969, pp. 114-
115.  
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However, even if in fact the condition and result are identical, the erroneous 
separation in thought is enough to allow the regress to begin and for the inherent 
contradictions in relational thought to emerge: “the question”, Bradley insists, “ is 
how without error we may think of reality”.37 Ironically, Wollheim’s own example 
demonstrates that the condition and result are distinguishable in thought and this is the 
very point that Bradley requires in order to highlight the contradictions inherent in 
thinking relationally.  We need to be able to separate the condition and the result, the 
term and its relation to another term, if we are to be able to identify a quality (colour 
A) as one quality among others (distinct from colour B).  However, in so doing, if the 
relation is internal, we open the door to the devastating infinite division of conditions 
and results in the quality itself.  
 
Leibniz’s position on this matter is complex.  On the one hand, he would appear to 
agree with Bradley’s point that in order to distinguish one quality, we must 
understand it in relation to others.  Even the most seemingly absolute and non-
relational term contains some reference to others.  In the New Essays, he takes issue 
with Locke’s distinction between absolute terms which do not refer to anything 
outside of themselves and relative terms that do lead the mind to consider ideas of 
other things. For Locke, the term ‘black’ is absolute – it does not require reference to 
anything other than itself.  However, Leibniz points out that we can consider terms as 
absolute and non-relative only when we understand them incompletely. A complete or 
adequate idea of ‘black’ must include reference to its cause – for instance to the 
organisation of the particles in a black coloured object and to the way in which these 
particles interact with our organs of sight.  The same holds true of all terms, in 
Leibniz’s opinion: “there is no term which is so absolute or so detached that it does 
not involve relations and is not such that a complete analysis of it would lead to other 
things and indeed to all other things.”38   
 
On the other hand, however, it is not clear that Leibniz would have accepted 
Bradley’s claim that the condition and the result – the quality itself and its relations to 
others – can be separated within the quality itself in such a way as to produce an 
                                                        
37 Bradley: Appearance and Reality, p. 20. 
38 A VI vi 228; New Essays, trans. Remnant and Bennett, p. 228.  
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internal division within the quality itself that then generates the destructive infinite 
regress that Bradley conceives. As Ishiguro notes with explicit appeal to the 
discussion of absolute and relative terms in the New Essays, “Leibniz’s general thesis, 
then, is ... that there is no way of characterizing things without invoking both the 
relational properties and the non-relational properties of the things in question.”39 In 
the context of Bradley’s critique, we may presume that Leibniz would deny that we 
identify the quality in itself, as condition, separately from consideration of the quality 
in relation to others, as result.  In other words, it is not possible to separate the two 
aspects that Bradley thinks comprise a quality’s “double-character”.    However, even 
if relational and non-relational properties of a quality or term are separable, the 
ensuring infinite regress might not be as devastating as Bradley makes out. We shall 
discuss this in a moment, but first, let us briefly mention the fourth and final part of 
Bradley’s argument against relations.  
 
(iv) Relations with qualities (terms) are unintelligible 
Bradley had argued in (iii) that there can be no relations in the absence of the qualities 
or terms that they relate.  Equally, however, he now argues in (iv) that taking terms or 
qualities with their relations is untenable for, as in the case of qualities with relations 
(ii), an infinite regress is generated. For a relation properly to relate two terms, it must 
be internally related to each term in turn. This however, introduces an internal 
diversity within the relation itself. When a relation relates A to B, Bradley insists that 
it cannot be merely a common property of both A and B (“for then what keeps them 
apart?”), nor can it belong only to both A and B separately (“for then again there is no 
relation between them”).40  Rather, the relation must be somehow over and above A 
and B taken individually.  But now we need a “new connecting relation” to relate the 
relation (R) itself to each of its terms.41 Not being a property of the terms, R begins to 
look like an independent term over and above A and B.  But how, then, is R related to 
A and to B? New relations must now come into play to relate R to A, on the one hand, 
and to B, on the other. However, the same problems immediately recur and the 
regress is set in train.  As Bradley eloquently explains:  
 
                                                        
39 Ishiguro: Leibniz’s Philosophy of Logic and Language, p. 107. 
40 Bradley: Appearance and Reality, p. 27 note 1. 
41 Bradley: Appearance and Reality, p.27. 
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“we are hurried off into the eddy of a hopeless process, since we are forced to 
go on finding new relations without end. The links are united by a link, and 
this bond of union is a link which also has two ends; and these require each a 
fresh link to connect them with the old.”42 
 
It is not uncommon to reject Bradley’s reasoning here on the ground that it falsely 
treats relations as if they were terms.43 If they are not terms, then there may be no 
need to insist the links must themselves be related and the regress does not begin. 
However, Bradley has already insisted that the relation must be something distinct 
from its terms, for otherwise, the terms will be no more than externally related (and 
hence not really related at all) or they will simply collapse into each other.  Besides, 
since relations are frequently themselves treated as subjects and compared and 
contrasted with each other – for instance, it might be said that the sibling relationships 
are closer than relationships between cousins – it is not clear just how much force this 
objection can really command.  
 
2.3 Vicious and non-vicious regresses 
A more promising rejoinder to Bradley’s arguments in both (ii) and (iv) addresses the 
issue of the infinite regress that relations generate. The response acknowledges the 
regress, but refuses to admit it as a serious problem. Thus, Wollheim describes the 
regress as ‘unobjectionable’.44  The relation, he claims, merely implies the regress; it 
does not require it as a condition of the very possibility of the relation.  If the relation 
merely generates an infinite regress as a consequence of itself, it is not a vicious 
regress.  If, on the other hand, the infinite regress is a condition that must be fulfilled 
on order for the relation to be, then the regress is vicious and makes relations 
impossible.45  Given that relational experiences occur, there is some reason to think 
that the regress is non-vicious. Certainly, Leibniz appears unconcerned by the infinite 
                                                        
42 Bradley: Appearance and Reality, p. 28. 
43 For instance, B. Russell: An Outline of Philosophy, London, 1927, p. 263.  Cited in 
Wollheim: F. H. Bradley, p. 113. See also, C. D Broad: An Examination of McTaggart’s 
Philosophy, 2 vols. Cambridge, 1933, vol. I, pp. 84-85. Leibniz too may be said to treat 
external relations as terms when he describes them as “ideal” or “mental” things. See note 57 
below.   
44 Wollheim: F. H. Bradley, p. 114. Cp. Broad: An Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy, 
vol. 1, pp. 85-86. 
45 Wollheim: F. H. Bradley, pp. 113-114. 
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regress involved in self-reflective perception. In his Paris Notes, he observes that self-
reflection – the perception of perception – involves an infinite regress, and he gives an 
account of how we might stimulate such perceptions, albeit suggesting that the regress 
is discovered rather than generated:  
 
“If anyone wants to experience these things [perpetual reflections on 
reflections], then all he has to do is this: at some time in the darkness of the 
night, when it happens that he cannot sleep, let him begin to think of himself 
and of his thinking and of the perception of perceptions, and begin to wonder 
at this state of his, and – as it were by different beats of the mind – go more 
and more within himself, or above himself; then he will wonder that he has not 
experienced this state of mind previously. ... I have not yet explained 
satisfactorily how there come about these different beats of the mind, with that 
constantly reciprocated reflection, and, as it were, the intervals of these beats. 
They seem to occur by the distinguishing awareness of the corporeal intention; 
but, if you observe carefully, that beat only brings it about that you remember 
that you had this – namely, the reflection of a reflection – in the mind a little 
before, and you, as it were, observe this, and designate it by a distinct image 
which accompanies it.  Therefore it had already existed before, and so the 
perception of a perception to infinity is perpetually in the mind, and in that 
there consists its existence per se, and the necessity of the continuation.”46  
 
Leibniz hints in this final sentence that not only is the infinite regress of perceptions 
of perceptions non-vicious, it is also necessary to the very existence and continued 
existence of the mind itself.  
 
On his side, Bradley denies the substantial reality of the mind. Regarding his four-part 
argument against relations as conclusive proof that “Every relation does and again 
does not qualify its terms, and is and is not qualified by them”,47 he establishes, to his 
                                                        
46 A VI iii 516-517; “On Reminiscence and on the Mind’s Self-reflection” (April 1676), trans 
G. H. R. Parkinson: G. W. Leibniz: De Summa Rerum. Metaphysical Papers, 1675-1676, New 
Haven & London, pp. 73, 75.  
47 Bradley: “Relation”, p. 638. See also: “Every relation  (unless our previous inquiries have 
led to error) has a connexion with its terms which, not simply internal or external, must in 
principle be both at once.” (ibid., p. 641).  
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own satisfaction, the contradictory nature of all relations.   To accept relations as true 
and real absolutely is therefore “plainly untenable”.48  Such reasoning extends to the 
idea of a mind, soul or self, conceived as standing in relation to whatever is not-self, 
an external world of nature. The idea of mind, soul or self, substantial or otherwise, is 
fraught with contradiction: in reality, there can be no individual selves. 
 
Nevertheless, Bradley cannot – and does not – deny experiences such as Leibniz’s 
reflective perception of perception altogether. Relational thinking in which we 
separate ourselves from the objects of our thought and separate the objects from each 
other may be contradictory appearances, but relational phenomena do occur. But how 
can this be?  Relations, so Bradley contends, are “actual or real” only insofar as they 
are contained within a “felt unity”:   
 
“to be actual or real, surely there is nothing which can fail in some sense to be 
contained in it [i.e. feeling] and to belong to it, however much within its own 
further character it must also pass beyond. Thus every relation, to be even 
possible, must itself bear the character of an element within a felt unity – and 
apart from that is an abstraction which by itself is nothing.”49  
 
Hence, for Bradley, self and not-self stand in relation to one another only when held 
together in an immediate experience or feeling that is a unitary finite centre of 
experience. Neither self nor not-self exists – or can exist – as a distinct substance; 
each is only one aspect within a finite centre’s experience. “Self” acquires meaning by 
being placed in opposition to whatever is considered as “not-self”,50 but this relational 
opposition can be real only to the extent to which it is unified in a finite centre’s 
experience. The distinction between the self and the not-self is a distinction made 
within a finite centre’s experiential content.51  Hence, Bradley would seem to be in 
                                                        
48 Bradley: “Relations”, p. 641. 
49 Bradley: “Relations”, pp. 633-634.  
50 Bradley: “What is the Real Julius Caesar?”, p. 416. See also, Bradley: Appearance and 
Reality, pp. 75-82. 
51 The actual experiential content – what belongs on the side of the self and what belongs on 
the non-self side – is fluid: “It is far from certain that at some time every feature of the self 
has, sooner or later, taken its place in the not-self; but it is quite certain that this holds of by 
far the larger part. And we are hence compelled to admit that very little of the self can belong 
to it essentially” (Bradley: Appearance and Reality, p. 78.  
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agreement with Leibniz’s view that an experience can contain relational thought, even 
if a regress is implicated by self-conscious awareness in one’s perception of one’s 
own perceptions. Like a finite centre of experience, a monad’s perceptual state may 
combine the perceiving self with its perceptual content and still hold all in a single 
unity.   
 
3. Monism and pluralism 
 
So far we have been considering finite centres individually. However, each finite 
centre is only one finite centre among many and must be related to these others too.  
Accordingly, Bradley argues that for these relations between the finite centres 
themselves to be actual, they too must be held within an even wider experience. My 
experience of my-self as distinguished from my-not-self, and your experience of 
your-self as distinguished from your-not-self can only co-exist in relation to each 
other provided they are unified within a wider experiential whole. Pursuing this line 
of reasoning, Bradley postulates the existence of an Absolute Experience that 
encompasses all experiences:  
 
“the one Reality is present in a plurality of finite centres, but so that these do 
not directly share their experiences as immediate. None the less the one 
Universe is there, and it is real throughout, and it is also a higher experience in 
which every unshared diversity is unified and harmonized.”52  
 
The various experiences had by a plurality of finite centres of experience are united 
within the one infinite Absolute Experience. This Experience is an undivided unity 
within which our own finite experiences are merely ‘components’ or aspects. In this 
way, Bradley admits only one substance or, rather, one unified Experience as Reality. 
 
Leibniz’s view is somewhat different. The Leibnizian world is no more than an 
aggregate of substances, each of which is strictly independent of the others and 
capable of existing in their absence.  Leibniz advocates a plurality of individual 
substances, each of which holds both self and not-self within its unitary experiences, 
                                                        
52 Bradley: “What is the Real Julius Caesar?”, p. 413.  
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but which do not have to be glued together by a Spinozistic or Bradleian Absolute. 
So, can the Leibnizian plurality of individual substances survive the Bradleian 
critique of relations? I have already cast doubt on Bradley’s argument against internal 
relations, suggesting that the infinite regress that is generated there may not be 
problematic – the regress might not be vicious – at least in the case of monads’ 
perceptions. If the regress is not vicious, then each monad can, like Bradley’s 
Absolute, unify its internally related content and indeed, can contain the entire world 
within itself.  This, as we shall see, provides a basis from which external relations 
may ensue.  
 
Certainly, through its perceptions, each mind, soul and entelechy represents 
everything in the universe. Moreover, perceiving minds, souls and entelechies are like 
mirrors that represent the whole universe.53  The monad’s qualities – its perceptions 
and appetitions54 – are implicitly relational: perceptions are always perceptions of 
something; appetitions are always focused on a desired object or possible state of 
affairs. Perceptions, as Ishiguro notes, are relational facts in which external 
complexity is represented in the simple.55 The essence or concept of each individual 
substance brings that substance into relation with all the other substances that make 
up the world, each holding its perceptions of all of the others within its own unitary 
experience or sequence of experiences.  
 
Monads’ qualities are internally relational both in the non-Bradleian sense that they 
are internal to the monad (they arise spontaneously from the monad’s essence and 
would do so even if no other monad existed) and in the Bradleian sense that the 
relational qualities, its perceptions and appetitions, are constitutive of the monad’s 
identity – the qualities cannot be separated from the monad as if they were just 
insignificant extras. Did the monad not possess the qualities that relate them to other 
actual or merely possible beings, it would not be the particular monad that it is.  What 
happens in other possible or actual beings is reflected in the internal relational 
                                                        
53  GP IV 434; Discourse on Metaphysics, trans R. Ariew and D. Garber:  G. W. Leibniz: 
Philosophical Essays, Cambridge, 1989, p. 42.  
54 GP VI 598; Principles of Nature and of Grace, trans Ariew and Garber, p. 207.  
55 Ishiguro: Leibniz’s Philosophy of Logic and Language, p. 110.  Hence, in sharp contrast to 
Russell’s account of monadic predicates as non-relational, Ishiguro observes that “although 
“... perceives” and “... perceives something” are monadic predicate expressions in the sense 
that they have only one blank space, they express relational properties.” (ibid.).  
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qualities of each substance: “there are no extrinsic denominations, and no one 
becomes a widower in India by the death of his wife in Europe unless a real change 
occurs in him.”56 Similarly, he writes to De Volder:  
 
In my opinion, there is nothing in the whole created universe which does not 
need, for its perfect concept, the concept of everything else in the universality 
of things, since everything flows into [influo] every other thing in such a way 
that if anything is removed or changes, everything in the world will be 
different from what it is now.57  
 
Each monad contains, as it were, the whole world, represented from its own unique 
perspective. In this respect, Leibniz’s monads seem to perform the same unifying 
function as Bradley’s finite centres of experience and, ultimately, as Bradley’s 
Absolute Experience. Bradley conceives the Absolute as transforming relations in 
order to resolve the apparent contradictions. The Absolute Experience is not a 
relational experience – the Absolute is not an intellect that thinks relationally. 
Leibniz, however, regarding the infinite regress generated by self-conscious 
perception as unproblematic, retains qualities as relational within the monadic unity.   
The unity of the monad can embrace relational thoughts without destroying them. For 
Bradley, problems concerning internal relations are resolved through their 
incorporation within an Absolute Experience. For Leibniz, not acknowledging 
Bradley’s regress problem, relational qualities are incorporated without contradiction 
within monads’ experiences, each of which, albeit from its own perspective, is a 
unified representation of the manifold multiplicity of the world in its entirety.  
 
However, Leibniz rejects solipsism. There is not only one monad that embraces an 
entire world in its perceptions.  On the contrary, he conceives an infinity of such 
                                                        
56 GP VII 321-322; On the method of distinguishing real from imaginary phenomena, trans L. 
Loemker: G. W. Leibniz:  Philosophical Papers and Letters, Dordrecht, 1969, p. 365. And in 
a letter to Arnauld, 14 July 1686, Leibniz explains: “the concept of an individual substance 
includes all its events and all its denominations, even those which are commonly called 
extrinsic, that is, those which pertain to it only by virtue of the general connection of things 
and from the fact that it expresses the whole universe in its own way.” (GP II 56; trans 
Loemker: G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, p. 337). 
57 GP II 226; to De Volder, 6 July 1701, trans Loemker: G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Papers 
and Letters, pp. 524-525.  In a footnote, Loemker reminds us that the term ‘influo’ here 
indicates logical dependency (p. 540 n12). 
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monads – an infinite plurality of finite substances, each of which represents all the 
others in its unified experience.  Moreover, Leibniz also conceives each monad, with 
its internal relational qualities, as utterly devoid of “windows”.  The windowlessness 
of the monads entails an extreme form of causal independence among the monads 
such that each could exist with no change to its nature and perceptions even if the 
others did not exist.  Despite their internal relations whereby what happens in another 
substance affects what occurs in the former, the plurality of created windowless 
monads implies external relations among them.58  Pluralism, as Bradley himself was 
well aware, requires external relations:  “Pluralism, to be consistent, must, I presume, 
accept the reality of external relations.”59  
 
However, given Bradley’s critique, the question arises as to whether monads can 
indeed be externally related to each other. Whereas external relations among 
Bradley’s finite centres are transmuted or incorporated within the Absolute 
Experience, Leibniz, rejecting monism, has no recourse to such a solution.  So, the 
question remains: can his substance-pluralism survive Bradley’s denial of external 
relations? Could Leibniz have given a satisfactory response to the charges Bradley 
                                                        
58 In Leibniz’s opinion, external relations are mental abstractions grounded in qualities of the 
related things: “My judgment about relations is that paternity in David is one thing, sonship in 
Solomon another, but that the relation common to both is a merely mental thing whose basis 
is the modifications of the individuals” (GP II 486; letter to Des Bosses, 21 April 1714, trans 
Loemker, G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, p. 609). See also:  
“The ratio or proportion between two lines, L and M, may be conceived three several 
ways; as a ratio of the greater L, to the lesser M; as a ratio of the lesser M, to the 
greater L; and lastly, as something abstracted from both, that is, as a ratio between L 
and M, without considering which is the antecedent, or which the consequent; which 
the subject, and which the object. … 
In the first way of considering them, L the greater; in the second, M the 
lesser, is the subject of the accident, which philosophers call relation.  But which will 
be the subject, in the third way of considering them?  It cannot be said that both of 
them, L and M together, are the subject of such an accident; for if so, we should have 
an accident in two subjects, with one leg in one and the other in the other; which is 
contrary to the notion of accidents.  Therefore, we must say, that this relation, in this 
third way of considering it, is indeed out of the subjects; but being neither a 
substance, nor an accident, it must be a mere ideal thing.” (GP VII 401; Leibniz’s 
fifth letter to Clarke, trans H. G. Alexander: The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, 
Manchester, 1956, p. 71)  
Russell attributed Leibniz’s view of external relations as mere ideal things to his inability “to 
admit as ultimately valid, any form of judgment other than the subject-predicate form” 
(Russell: A Critical Exposition, p. 13).  
59 Bradley: Essays on Truth and Reality, Oxford, 1914, p. 237. 
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brought against external relations?  In what follows, I suggest that, rather than answer 
the charges directly, Leibniz could have, in large part, circumvented them.  
 
When Bradley argued against external relations in (i) and (iii), he had insisted that the 
process or means by which a quality comes into existence alongside others cannot be 
separated from the quality itself, the product.  The existence of a quality such as “red” 
bears some essential relation of difference to other colours and the process of 
identifying “red” as a distinct colour is in part a process of differentiation from other 
colours.  The other colours are essential to our ability to recognise “red” as a distinct 
colour, but also the very nature of redness itself requires the relations of difference to 
other colours that were essential to our identification of it. Bradley, in effect, refused 
to separate the process by which a quality comes into being and quality itself, the 
product of that process.  
 
Leibniz, as we saw, also held that, epistemologically, process and product, the cause 
and its effect, are inseparable. As we noted earlier, for instance, Leibniz insisted 
against Locke that the term’ black’, if adequately known, must include details of its 
cause.   However, for Leibniz, the formation of concepts, from those of qualities to 
the complete concepts of individual substances, occurs at the level of possibility.  It is 
here that process and product are inseparable.  The process of production of the 
complete concepts (and possible worlds) in the divine mind has been analysed in 
detail by Ohad Nachtomy. Stating the Bradleian dilemma succinctly – “On the one 
hand, individuals presuppose their relations; on the other hand, relations also 
presuppose the individuals they relate”60 –, he offers a route out of the problem that 
involves distinguishing incomplete (non-relational) concepts of individuals from the 
complete concepts of individuals that include relations of that individual to all others 
in the same possible world. Through God’s co-consideration of the incomplete 
concepts, the concepts of individuals, now considered in relation to each other, 
acquire the internal relational predicates that complete them and that, at the same time 
locate each individual within a particular possible world. Complete concepts and 
possible worlds are thereby “mutually constitutive”.61  
                                                        
60 O. Nachtomy: Possibility, Agency, and Individuality in Leibniz’s Metaphysics, Dordrecht, 
2007, p. 93. 
61 Nachtomy: Possibility, Agency, and Individuality, p. 108. See also, p. 97. 
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On this account, the identification of the individual (the product) through its 
differentiation from others (the process) is performed in the divine mind prior to the 
creative act that brings actual individuals into existence. External relations among the 
concepts of possible individuals arise from their co-consideration in a single thought 
in the divine mind and lead to the inclusion of internal relational predicates in these 
concepts of possible individuals, a process in which the concepts of individuals 
become complete.  These complete concepts with their relational predicates are held 
in the divine mind as God chooses which world to create.  
 
In this way, the inseparability of process and product that led Bradley to deny purely 
external relations occurs prior to creation, leaving the way open for actual external 
relations among individuals to arise on the creation of a pluralistic world. At the point 
of the creation of a world, each monad can be regarded as an independent being. The 
process of construction of its essence has occurred in God’s mind, prior to its 
creation. A monad’s internal relational qualities (perceptions and appetitions) are 
established at the level of possibility. These point to other substances that, when they 
too are created by God, are not only internally related to the others, but also externally 
related, for each created substance is independent and separable from the others: any 
of the others might be annihilated without incurring any change to the internal 
relational qualities or essences of those remaining.62 These external relations require 
only the existence of the others. The coming together of product and process that 
generate the internal relational qualities – so crucial to the identity of each one of 
them considered singly – has already taken place and need not now pose a problem 
for external relations among created things.     
 
Bradley had supposed that all relations fall into two mutually exclusive camps:  
relations are either internal or external.  He then argued relations and qualities (terms) 
must be both internally related and externally related, but that they cannot consistently 
be either internally or externally related.  Internal relations threaten the separation 
                                                        
62 Clearly, external relations among substances appear at the level of created reality, but of 
course external relations among concepts are present in the realm of possibility, where, we 
may assume that, although externally related to each other, they are united in God’s thought.  
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required for terms to be individuals that can then be related to each other, yet external 
relations separate their terms so much that they cease to be related at all.  His response 
to this contradiction was to propose a metaphysical monism according to which all 
apparent relations and relational thought are transformed beyond recognition within 
the single Absolute Experience.  
 
Leibniz’s pluralism also requires both internal and external relations: substances must 
be both internally related and externally related. However, I have suggested that in 
Leibniz’s case, this need not necessarily lead to the contradictory state of affairs that 
Bradley would later outline. For Leibniz, monadic relations are internal in one 
respect, namely, in relation to the monad’s representative or expressive nature, as 
specified by the relational predicates included in the possible complete concept of the 
individual through the co-consideration of incomplete concepts in the divine mind. 
These relational predicates – ultimately the relational qualities or properties of created 
monads – are essential to the very identity of the monad and it is in this sense that it 
can be said that what occurs in one created monad is reflected in – and makes a 
difference to – the others. On the other hand, monadic relations are external insofar as 
each monad is an independent, windowless substance created as one among many 
other such windowless substances in a pluralistic universe.  In short, monads have 
internal relational properties and also stand in external relations to others. No 
contradiction arises provided each kind of relation is considered in respect of its 
proper domain and understood in the correct manner.  
 
Nevertheless, attractive though this solution may seem, it does not entirely absolve 
Leibniz from the difficulties that Bradley raises regarding relations. By way of 
conclusion, I will mention one. It may be objected that the account given above, far 
from resolving Bradley’s worries, merely transfers the problem of relations from the 
world of created things to the realm of possibilities.  Bradley insists that the Absolute 
Experience does not think in relational terms. Although finite centres of experience 
can, and do, think relationally, their relational thought is still fraught with 
contradictions arising from the infinite regress that arises in relation to internal 
relations.  According to Bradley, the Absolute, if it is to be non-contradictory, cannot 
become embroiled such infinite regresses and is therefore assumed not to think 
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relationally. Leibniz’s God, on the other hand, does appear to consider things 
relationally.     
 
In one respect, this, for Leibniz, is perfectly reasonable. After all, as we have seen, he 
does not consider the infinite regress arising from internal relations as vicious. No 
vicious regress makes monads’ relational thoughts contradictory and nor, we may 
suppose, does a vicious regress infect God’s relational thought.   However, even if we 
allow that God can, in principle, think relationally, there remains a question as to the 
origin of the non-relational terms (and incomplete concepts) whose co-consideration 
in God’s Mind leads to the formation of the complete concepts of possible 
individuals. God is supposed to co-consider what are otherwise independent terms, 
but how can such a plurality of terms arise in the first instance?  Do they not, as 
Bradley maintains, need to be differentiated from each other – and hence considered 
in relation to each other – before each can be a separate term? Are not their 
differences from each other at least in part constitutive of their unique identities?  The 
resulting circle would seem to be one that even God could not break: for God to co-
consider many logically independent things, He would have to first conceive each 
separately, but this is not possible, since the identification of one term among many 
requires that the terms are co-considered at least in respect of their differences.   It 
would seem, on this reasoning, to be logically impossible for God to conceive many 
independent things prior to considering them in relation to each other. Nor does 
Leibniz’s understanding of God help in this regard. His account of the construction of 
incomplete and complete forms starts from a conception of God in which God’s mind 
is already in possession of a plurality of eternal simple forms.63 Our question here, 
however, concerns the very possibility of this plurality.   Bradley’s concerns about the 
plurality of forms (or terms) have merely resurfaced at this earlier stage.64  
 
 
                                                        
63 Nachtomy: Possibility, Actuality, and Agency, pp. 22-23. 
64 One might at this point emphasise the eternality of the simple forms and declare that an 
explanation of their plurality, while not forthcoming, is also unnecessary.  Alternatively, one 
might suggest that God be conceived as in possession of only one simple form in the first 
instance and explore ways in which plurality may arise from this – perhaps through repetition 
or recursion.  
